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Reference should be made here to the case of Childs v. O'Donnell42 which
has been cited for the proposition.that a warranty on a sale of one bill of goods
does not attach to a sale of another bill at a later time.43 No such rule can be
drawn from the case inasmuch as the court held, in answer to the buyer's
claim of reliance on an express warranty previously given, that there was no
warranty; merely an option to return the goods if unsatisfactory. But the
dicta of the court is appropriate to the general question under consideration:
"The language used cannot be construed as a warranty. The sale of the first order
was one on approval simply, with the privilege of a trial of the goods. As a matter of
law, this option, even, did not extend to subsequent orders and invoices of goods,
unless repeated with each order, or unless some zeneral language was used covering
all orders or sales."44
CONCLUSIONS
The general rule would appear to be that express warranties do not carry
over to subsequent sales of the same product between the same parties. Thus
where the buyer makes subsequent purchases in reliance on tests he has made
or where it would be unreasonable for the buyer to rely on the previous
express warranties because of the nature of the transaction (retailer-consumer
relationship), the warranties do not subsist and attach to subsequent sales.
This rule is subject to the exception that the intention of the parties may be to
have the warranties carry over to subsequent sales. Such an intention has
been held to appear where:
1) The parties expressly declare that the warranties given shall apply to
subsequent sales.
2)- The subsequent order refers expressly and specifically to a previous
order in which express warranties were given.
3) The parties contemplated a series of transactions or a future course
of dealings and the logical inference from all the facts and circumstances
is that the warranties were meant to survive the original transaction (manu-
facturer-retailer relationship and the steady customer situation).
THE CUSTODY AWARD WITHOUT THE DIVORCE DECREE
Does equity have jurisdiction to render custodial awards when it has found
the facts insufficient to order a divorce or separation? More realistically put,
may a court, upon the unsuccessful suit of one of the parents for a legal disso-
lution of the marriage, take cognizance of the fact that, although the marital bond
must remain unsevered by law, the marital relationship is clearly cut in fact
and, in an exercise of discretion, award the custody of the children of the mar-
riage to the more worthy parent? In a field of legal study not famed for the
42. 84 Mich. 533, 47 N. W. 1108 (1891).
43. Powers v. Briggs, 139 Mich. 664, 103 N. W. 194 (1905).
44. Childs et al. v. O'Donnell, 84 Mich. 533, 538, 47 N. W. 1108, 1109 (1891) (italics
supplied).
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present clarity and predictability of its decisions, it would seem that no general
question could be more precisely posed nor so unequivocally answered. However,
such is not the case. A recent case, Johnson v. Levis,' decided by the Iowa
Supreme Court, fully manifests the complex considerations which burden
the courts handling the problem. In that case the trial court found the facts
insufficient to decree the divorce sought by both parents but did award the
custody of two minor children to the plaintiff-mother with rights of visitation
to the defendant-father-in the meanwhile retaining jurisdiction over the cus-
tody matter in the interests of the children's well-being. On certiorari brought
by the father against the trial judge Iowa's highest tribunal sustained the writ
and found, not without an exhaustive dissent,2 that the jurisdiction of the trial
judge to render custodial orders terminated when the plea for divorce failed.
The difficulties of the Iowa court in answering the question before it prompt a
brief discussion of the historical, statutory and equitable considerations which
make the problem more complex than it seems at first blush.
I
At early common law in England jurisdiction over divorce was in the ecclesi-
astical courts and in Parliament.3 In the United States jurisdiction over di-
vorce was in the assemblies,4 though for a time this authority to dissolve the
marital bond was torpid s On the other hand, jurisdiction over children, and
custody in particular, was in the courts of chancery in both England and the
United States.6
The state legislatures in time enacted statutes which, to some extent, did away
with the distinction in the jurisdiction over custody and divorce. Under these
statutes, which delimit the causes or grounds upon which a divorce or separation
may be decreed, the authority to pronounce a decree of divorce or separation
has been delegated to the equity courts.7 Incident to this decree of divorce,
1. 38 N. W. 2d 115 (1949).
2. Id. at 118.
3. 1 BIs oP, MARRIAGE, DivoRc- ,nD SEPARATION §§ 115-149 (Ist ed. 1891).
4. Ibid.
5. 2 Kcmr, CoximTARIs § 97 (14th ed. 1896), "During the period of our colonial
government, for more than one hundred years preceding the Revolution, no divorce took
place in the colony of New York, and for many years after New York became an inde-
pendent state, there was not any lawful mode of dissolving a marriage in the lifetime of
the parties but by a special act of the legislature."
6. In speaking of the origin of the equitable jurisdiction over infants Pomeroy says:
"It may, in its very inception, have belonged to the King as a part of his executive power
as parens patride to protect his subjects, and may by him have been transferred to the
court of chancery. It is, however, firmly established as a judicial function of the court....
The same inherent jurisdiction is possessed, although not exercised so freely and minutely,
by the American courts, unless curtailed or taken away by a statute,-a fact very difficult
of explanation, on the assumption that the jurisdiction is a part of the executive functions
of the crown." 3 PoloY, EQumr JURISPRUDEN E § 1304 (4th ed. 1918).
7. Actually there has been no change in the seat of jurisdiction over divorce and sepa-
ration. This is still retained by the legislature. What has happened, however, is that the
1950]
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the courts were also authorized to award custody of the children to one or the
other participant in the divorce proceeding. Hence the question arises: By such
enactments have the state legislatures confined the general equitable jurisdiction
of the courts over children to the successfully maintained divorce or separation
action? Or does the right to award custody still inhere in the court of equity
apart from statutory provisions so that an award of custody may be granted,
though the divorce or separation is denied?
The answer to the question has depended upon the Interpretation given by
the various state courts to the statutes involved. There are statutes which ex-
pressly limit the custodial power of the court to those suits where a divorce
or separation is decreed; 8 while other states have statutes which expressly grant
the power to award custody where there is no such decree.0 Where the statutes
are not clear, the jurisdictions have split, some courts inferring the limitations,10
(Johnson v. Levis is in this category), and others refusing to infer such a limi-
tation." In the latter instance the courts sustain their conclusion on the grounds
that the statute is not prohibitive and that, therefore, the courts may rely on
their inherent jurisdiction over children in making custodial awards where a
divorce or separation suit has failed.'
2
II
One of the leading cases relied on by the courts which infer that jurisdiction
over children in a divorce action is limited to the successfully maintained action
is the New York case of Davis v. Davis.13 In the Davis case an action brought
for separation failed. The question arose as to whether the court could, never-
theless, award custody of the children. Basing its decision on a section of a
statute' 4 which provided for the rendition -of custodial orders when a separation
was decreed, the court held that it was without jurisdiction to award custody,
since the separation sought had not been decreed. Another section of the same
statute, however, provided that custody could be awarded even though a sepa-
legislature no longer arbitrarily passes an enactment dissolving a marital bond, but has
crystalized its voice in statutes providing for a dissolution of the marital bond upon proof
of certain facts. The authority conferred on the judiciary is merely to pronounce that
these facts are present, and, therefore, the legislature decrees the marital bond dissolved.
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-127 (1933); Black v. Black, 165 Ga. 207, 140 S.E. 364 (1927);
ILL. REv. STAT. c. 40, § 18 (1939) ; Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, 95 N. E. 345 (1911).
9. N. D. Rnv. CODE § 4401 (1913); Tank v. Tank, 69 N. D. 39, 283 N. W. 787 (1939);
CAL. Crv. CODE § 136 (1935). Ex Parte Saul, 31 Cal. App. 382, 160 Pac. 695 (1916).
10. IOWA CODE § 598.14 (1946); OHio GEN. CODE ANN. § 8032 (1935); Gatton v. Gat-
ton, 41 Ohio App. 397, 179 N.W. 745 (1931). For the view generally accepted by this
line of cases see Davis v. Davis, 75 N. Y. 221 (1878).
11. Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 35-117 (1931); Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P. 2d
953 (1937) ; MIss. CODE ANN. § 1421 (1930) ; Davis v. Davis, 194 Miss. 343, 12 So. 2d 435
(1943); ARx. DiO. STAT. § 3808 (1921), c. 49, § 3808, Horton v. Horton, 75 Ark. 22, 86
S. W. 824 (1905).
12. See note 9 supra.
13. Davis v. Davis, 7S N. Y. 221 (1878).
14. 2 N. Y. REV. STAT. 147, § 54 (1827 & 1828).
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ration was not decreed.' 5 The court interpreted this section to mean that, al-
though a separation decree was not necessary, nevertheless, the party seeking
custody had to establish grounds for such separation.'0 These conclusions re-
sulted from the premise that the authority to award custody in a divorce action
was purely statutory.17 Bound by this theory, the New York courts considered
that they had the authority to award custody only where a divorce or separation
was granted until 1941 when Section 1170-a was added to the New York Civil
Practice Act which expressly allowed custodial orders whether or not a divorce
or separation sought was granted.i8 Accordingly, the Davis case is no longer
controlling on this point in New York. However, as a basis for the principle
that the authority to award custody in a divorce or separation action is purely
statutory, it has never been questioned or overruled. It is in this sense that the
reasoning of the Davis case became the bulwark of the courts inferentially deny-
ing custodial orders where a divorce or separation has failed.3
Other arguments have been presented in furtherance of the position taken by
these courts. One such argument is expressed by the prevailing opinion in the
Johnson case.20 This is that the statute providing for the rendition of custodial
orders must be interpreted in the light of another statutory provision concerning
the parity of control of husbands and wives over their children.2 It was this
statute which abrogated the common law priority of the husband over the minor
children of the marriage and declared that the parents are the natural guardians
of their minor children, and equally entitled to their care and custody. Reflecting
on this parity of control, the court in the Johnson case considered that the
legislature intended to create an equality, and that if any disturbance was to
be allowed, it must expressly appear in some other statute; since the statutes
do not expressly provide for the rendition of custodial orders when a divorce
15. In this case the court interpreted Section 55 of that statute as dependent for its
meaning on the preceding section, Section 54, which provided for a decree of separation
where the husband was guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment. Section 55 read "Although
a decree for separation from bed and board be not made. . . ." the court may award
custody of the children. This was interpreted as an alternative to a legal separation, when
cruel and inhuman treatment was present.
16. Light v. Light, 124 App. Div. 567, 180 N. Y. Supp. 931 (2d Dep't 1903).
17. Davis v. Davis, 75 N. Y. 221, 227 (1878).
18. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1170-a (1946), provides that if the "couri for any reason
whatsoever, other than lack of jurisdiction, refuses to grant a judgment of divorce, separa-
tion or annulment . . . the court may, nevertheless, render judgment in the same action
making such directions as justice requires, between the parties, for the custody, care, edu-
cation, and maintenance of any child of the marriage." Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y.
146, 81 N. E. 2d 60 (1948).
19. Id. at 152, 81 N. W. 2d at 63; Fein v. Fein, 261 N. Y. 441, 444, 185 N. E. 693, 694
(1933) ; Lord v. Lord, 80 W. Va. 547, 92 S. E. 749 (1917).
20. Johnson v. Levis, 38 N. W. 2d 115, 116 (1949).
21. IOWA CODE § 668.1 (1946). 1 Vmunaa, A.max o.AI; FAnmmy LAws § 142 (Ist ed.
1932) states: "today in most jurisdictions the parents either by decision or by statute
are practically upon a basis of equality so far as the custody of the minor children is con-
cerned. - . . "
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or separation is denied, the courts are without authority In such cases to award
custody. Moreover, it may be said that to award custody where there is no legal
divorce or separation would lead to an incongruous situation. It might be argued
that such an award would constitute a judicial sanction to a breaking up of
the home. Giving custody of the offspring to one of the parents would tend
also to operate against a reconciliation of the parties. Such a result would appear
to be out of conformity with traditional concepts of equity jurisprudence which
predicate a legal separation on the offense of one of the parties. Thus, if there
is no decree of separation or divorce, or if there are not sufficient grounds for
such a decree as was the New York rule,22 in awarding custody the courts in-
directly would be decreeing a legal separation where neither party was at fault.
Finally, the argument is offered that an award of custody is only an incident
to a plea for divorce or separation. 23 If the primary relief sought is not granted,
it would seem improper under this theory to allow the incidental relief.
The courts which declare this lack of authority to award custodial orders
unless a divorce is decreed do not leave the parties without a remedy. They
suggest two possible solutions; one the writ of habeas corpus,2 4 and the other,
an independent action in equity where custody is the only issue Introduced.
In the latter instance, as mentiond by the majority opinion in the Johnson case,25
the court would look to its inherent authority derived from the English Lord
Chancellor's historic position as the "King's conscience" and as such would
make an award of custody as the welfare of the child required.
III
The opposite position taken by those courts which have awarded custody with-
out a legal divorce or separation has, it is submitted, a more sound basis. In
the case of Urbach v. Urback,26 in answer to the contention that custody in a
divorce action was merely incidental to the divorce, the court pointed out that
it was equally possible that the divorce could be incidental to custody. The
court held that the true determinant should be the scope of the pleadings and
the trial. This approach would appear to be reasonable. If the pleadings raise
the issue of custody as well as that of divorce, and if evidence is presented on
both of these issues, the trial court should be competent to award custody al-
though the evidence is not sufficient to sustain a divorce. Nor should it be
denied jurisdiction because the divorce is denied; for it is a well-known equi-
table maxim that "equitable jurisdiction having once attached, it will be con-
tinued for the final adjudication of all rights involved and thus avoid further
litigation in the future, even though this involves the giving of relief which is
22. This rule, established by the Davis case, was followed by the courts in New York
until early 1941 when in Schwartz v. Schwartz, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 547 (1941), the court antici-
pating the effective date of Section 1170-a of the Civil Practice Act, September 1, 1941,
awarded custody in a separation action where a separation was not decreed, nor were
grounds for it established.
23. Walker v. Walker, 140 Miss. 340, 105 So. 753 (1925) ; Davis v. Davis, 75 N. Y. 221,
227 (1878); Gatton v. Gatton, 41 Ohio App. 397, 179 N. E. 745 (1931).
24. Davis v. Davis, 75 N. Y. 221, 228 (1878).
25. Johnson v. Levis, 38 N. W. 2d 115, 118 (1949).
26. 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P. 2d 953 (1937).
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usually classified as legal."'2 7 It is submitted that the trial court would have
the same grounds for awarding custody as a judge in a habeas corpus proceeding
or an action where custody was the only issue introduced.
It is apparent that many parents are irreconcilable and permanently separated
before they ever seek a legal dissolution of the marital bond. The children of
such marriage are not enjoying the benefits and blessings which devoted parents
can provide. In awarding custody although denying a divorce or separation
under such circumstances, the court is looking out for the best interests of the
children, rather than giving judicial sanction to a breaking up of the home as
has been suggested. Such an approach is realistic and legal by virtue of equity's
power as parens patriae.28
The need for some solution to the problem of custody when the parents are,
in fact, living apart is evident. It is submitted that it does not appear consistent
with general equitable concepts to hold that the courts are without jurisdiction
to pass on the issue of custody only because a concomitant divorce or separation
is denied 9 This conclusion receives further support from the fact that even
those courts which so confine equitable power to the successfully maintained
action have recognized the inherent jurisdiction of equity over the custodial
rights of children by indicating, as did the majority of the court in the Johnson
case,30 that the proper remedy is in habeas corpus or an independent equitable
action for custody. Hence, the statute which the majority of the court in this
case relied on as authority for the rendition of custodial orders would actually
confer no new power over children to the courts. Rather, it would broaden the
scope of equity's jurisdiction over custody to actions where a decree of divorce
or separation Is sought as well as preserving it in actions where custody is the
sole issue. 1
Unfortunately, the historical background of this authority over divorce and
custody is overlooked by a considerable number of the courts. If the jurisdiction
over custody is an inherent equitable power,32 and not conferred in any sense
by the legislature, it would seem that no statute could remove or limit the
jurisdiction unless it was done in clear and unequivocal language.P In the ab-
sence of such a clear limitation, as is the case in most states, no inference of a
contradiction in existing equitable powers of the court should be made.
Answering the problem by this statutory distinction based on the historic
antecedents of equity's jurisdiction over custody would at least have the virtue
of unifying the varying judicial approaches to a difficult sociological issue which
can ill-afford legalistic hair-splitting.
27. CrL.m, PurcIPLmEs oP EQ=-nr § 24 (Ist ed. 1919).
28. 1 PomxEoY, EQurry JupaspRuDEscE § 294 (4th ed. 1914).
29. Cairnes v. Cairnes, 211 Ala. 342, 100 So. 317 (1924); Knoll v. Knoll, 114 La. 703,
38 So. 523 (1905) ; Power v. Power, 65 N. J. Eq. 93, 55 AUt. 111 (1903) ; Urbach v. Urbadh,
52 Wyo. 207, 73 P. 2d 953 (1937).
30. Johnson v. Levis, 38 N. W. 2d 115, 117 (1949).
31. 2 BIs oP, MuAPIAGF, DIVORCE AND SEPARATiON § 1185 (Ist ed. 1891).
32. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
33. 1 pommoy, EQurny JURISPRUDENCE §§ 279, 281 (4th ed. 1918). 2 V~rEnfn, A-..
icAN FAmimY LAWS § 95 (1st ed. 1932) states: "It seems at least doubtful that a statute
giving the court discretionary power when a divorce is granted would, by implication, deny
the power pending suit or if the decree is denied and the parties remain separate."
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